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Abstract 
Lack of adequate infrastructure is a significant inhibitor to increased trade of the countries of the Mediterranean 
region. Bringing their transport infrastructure to standards comparable with countries of a similar per capita GDP 
will be costly but worthwhile. 
We compare the current quantities of six types of transport infrastructure with international benchmarks, and 
estimate the additional quantities needed to reach the benchmarks. We also estimate the cost of that 
infrastructure and express it as a percentage of GDP. Finally we make tentative estimates of how much trade 
might be generated and how this might impact on GDP. All the estimates are made for 11 southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under four scenarios.  
The greatest need for additional infrastructure is for airport passenger terminals (between 52% and 56%), 
whereas the least is for more unpaved roads (between 7% and 13%). The investment (including maintenance) 
cost would be between 0.9% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP, although the investments in some countries would be 
between 1.4% and 4.5% of GDP. 
The impact on non-oil international trade would be substantial, but with differences between imports and 
exports. The overall trade balance of the 11 countries would be an improvement of between 5.4% and 17.2%, 
although some countries would continue to have a negative balance. A final assessment is made of the benefit 
ratio between the increase in GDP and the cost of transport investment. This varies between about 3 and 8, an 
indication of the high return to be expected from increased investment in transport infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of the analyses described here is to provide estimates of the costs to 11 southern and 
eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs)1 of bringing their transport infrastructure to specified 
standards, and of the macroeconomic benefits of those investments. The twin objectives of investment 
in transport infrastructure are to provide a basis for the transport and logistics services that will be 
needed to support the projected GDP and volume of international trade that is associated with that 
growth. The infrastructure investments and associated transport and logistics services will also 
contribute to further increases in GDP and trade above those assumed for the base situation.  
The report is in four sections. Following the introduction, the second section provides a description of 
the basic benchmarking approach to estimate the current deficiencies in transport infrastructure of the 
SEMCs. In the third there is a description of how the costs of making good on the transport 
infrastructure deficiencies are estimated for each of the four ‘Sessa framework’ scenarios (see Ayadi 
and Sessa, 2011). The method and results of estimating the macroeconomic benefits of the indicated 
investments are provided in the fourth and final section. 
The report is centred on specifications of transport infrastructure for four scenarios based on those of 
the Sessa framework, defined below. The quantities and qualities of transport infrastructure 
appropriate for each of the scenarios are based on a benchmarking approach. In this, the current 
quantities of transport infrastructure (measured on an average of a per area, per capita and per unit of 
GDP basis) were estimated from a database of current transport infrastructure and macroeconomic and 
social data for 139 countries. Then average benchmark values were derived for the countries for the 
various infrastructure combinations indicated in the specifications of the four scenarios. These 
averages were then extended up to 2030 by taking account of the population and GDP projections 
provided in other reports on the SEMCs. 
The first scenario is compatible with the Sessa Reference or ‘Business as Usual’ scenario. For the 
purposes of estimating the necessary transport infrastructure that would be associated with this 
scenario, the current quantities and qualities of transport infrastructure are compared with the global 
average benchmark values (Table 1). For the second scenario (compatible with the Common 
Development scenario of the Sessa framework), the necessary transport infrastructure is related to that 
currently found in the countries of the EU-27. For the third scenario (compatible with the Polarised 
Development scenario), the benchmark infrastructure provisions are the average of those of the 
countries that comprise the same per-capita income group as each of the 11 SEMCs. A different 
                                                   
* Until recently Robin Carruthers was a Lead Transport Economist at the World Bank, responsible for the quality 
of its evaluation of transport projects and its transport research, and is the principal author of its Toolkit on 
Transport Corridors and a major contributor to its guide to Trade and Transport Facilitation. He is now a 
consultant to several international lending institutions on transport, trade and infrastructure, and their 
interrelationships.  
1 The 11 countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. 
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approach was used for estimating the infrastructure provision for the final scenario (compatible with 
the Failed Development scenario of the Sessa framework). Instead of using quantity and quality 
benchmarks as the standards, the average investment in transport infrastructure (as a % of GDP) of 
each of the SEMCs over the last decade was assumed to continue for the whole of the 20-year 
assessment period. 
Table 1. Basis of scenario infrastructure benchmarks 
Scenario Benchmark infrastructure standard 
Reference Global average network density 
Common Development  Based on the EU-27 network density 
Polarised Development  Average density of a country per-capita income group 
Failed Development  National average of infrastructure investment of the last decade 
Source: Author. 
The estimated, total investment costs described in section 3 cover four transport modes and four types 
of investment expenditure: 
Transport modes 
 inter-urban roads (including both paved and unpaved roads); 
 railways; 
 port berths; 
 airports (including runways and terminals);  
Types of investment expenditure  
 improving the condition of current transport infrastructure to bring it up to the standards 
compatible with the relevant scenario;  
 upgrading the category of existing infrastructure (such as expanding the capacity of some two-lane 
roads to four lanes) to achieve the standards of the relevant scenario;  
 expanding the capacity of infrastructure facilities or extending the length of transport networks so 
as to provide the capacities and quantities indicated by the benchmark values for each of the 
scenarios; and  
 maintaining the improved, upgraded and expanded facilities and networks in the condition 
indicated in the scenario benchmarks.  
Part of the justification for proposed investments in transport infrastructure is that they will contribute 
to increases in GDP and international trade. The base-level projections of GDP are based on those 
made in other reports on the 11 SEMCs. We report here only the projected increases above these 
levels for each scenario. As a check that the proposed investments are financially feasible, they are 
also expressed as percentages of the base-level GDP projections. Similarly, estimates of additional 
international trade are expressed as increases above the base levels of international trade (also 
expressed as percentages of GDP) derived from other reports on the 11 SEMCs. These GDP and trade 
projections are the subject matter of section 4 of this report. 
2. Transport infrastructure benchmarking 
2.1 Transport infrastructure and economic and social development 
Roads, railways, ports and airports deliver economic and social benefits by connecting agricultural, 
mining and manufacturing producers to international and regional markets. Without reliable and 
competitively-priced freight transport infrastructure and services to connect to international markets, 
nations have little hope of trading their goods on the most advantageous terms. If they cannot transport 
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products to domestic markets, growth of GDP will be difficult if not impossible. Adequate transport 
infrastructure and services are needed to make both international and domestic markets work. 
When infrastructure is absent or degraded, it no longer fulfils its connective functions, and the 
economy suffers. As essential transactions and movements are delayed or disrupted, transport costs 
rise, individuals lose time in unremunerated commuting and firms must fight harder to compete. To 
restore the connections, new infrastructure must be built and existing infrastructure restored or 
improved.  
Transport infrastructure is expensive. The huge investments required to build highways, railways, 
airports and ports must be well planned. If regularly maintained, transport infrastructure can be long-
lived. But without maintenance, these valuable assets can deteriorate in a matter of a few years. Too 
often, the same roads end up being rebuilt over and over again, at a cost several times higher than if 
the appropriate maintenance measures had been taken on time. 
2.2 Benchmarking 
Comparisons of current transport infrastructure 
Comparisons of country transport infrastructure are used to assess whether the quantity and quality of 
provision of transport infrastructure are compatible with those of similar countries. If the comparison 
values show that the quantity and quality are less than the benchmark standards, a second stage of 
analysis is to estimate how great is the deficiency and how much additional infrastructure (or 
upgrading and improvement of already existing infrastructure) would be needed to bring the quantity 
and quality up to the benchmark levels. The third stage of the analysis is to see what public 
expenditure (or combination of public and private investment) is needed to finance this expansion, 
upgrading and improvement, and whether that amount is compatible with the funding likely to be 
available. To facilitate these analyses, the investments are expressed in absolute amounts and as 
percentages of GDP. The last stage is to look at the social and economic impacts of these investments 
to see if they are worthwhile, that is, whether the value of the additional GDP and international trade is 
greater than the cost of the investments. 
Benchmarking compared with other methods of infrastructure comparison 
Several factors complicate the estimation of transport investment needs, including the geographical 
specificity of the transport network and the existence of multiple modes of transport that both 
substitute for and complement one another. The literature contains several methodological approaches, 
including macroeconomic models, benchmarking, demand models and planning-based models that 
emphasise concepts of connectivity. The various approaches differ substantially in their strengths and 
weaknesses, as well as in their data requirements (Table 2). As might be expected, those that are least 
data-intensive also tend to give very general or aggregated conclusions. A more disaggregated 
estimation of the composition of investment requirements generally demands detailed modelling to 
reflect the geographical specificities of a given country’s transport network. 
Macroeconomic models typically exploit cross-country panel datasets to estimate the relationship 
between infrastructure stocks and a handful of basic social and economic parameters, such as 
population and GDP. This approach is exemplified by the work of Kohli et al. (1997), which estimated 
the transport investment requirements of the larger East Asian economies at 2–3% of GDP. Canning’s 
(1999) seminal paper linked this approach to a Cobb-Douglas production function framework and 
became the basis for a series of adaptations that were applied by the World Bank (Fay and Yepes, 
2003; Calderon and Serven, 2004; and Chatterton and Puerto, 2005). The average requirement for 
transport spending for the SEMCs that emerged from a review of this literature is 3.2% of GDP, 
including both investment and maintenance. This is higher than the shares of GDP that are indicated 
by our analyses (see Table 13).  
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Table 2. Methodologies available to estimate needs for transport investment 
 Strengths Weaknesses 
Macroeconometric 
models 
Econometrically grounded 
Exploit variation across countries and time 
High level of aggregation 
Limited explanatory factors 
Not location-specific 
Benchmarking Relative simplicity No clear theoretical foundation  
Choice of benchmark is arbitrary 
and may affect results significantly 
Not location-specific 
Demand models Explicitly model the demand–supply 
relationship in a framework that reflects the 
specificities of a country’s transport network 
Can be location-specific 
Data intensive 
Planning models Based on a detailed geographical model 
reflecting the specificities of a country’s 
transport network 
Can be location-specific 
Driven by planning goals rather 
than by economic trade-offs 
Source: Carruthers et al. (2008). 
A further refinement of the macroeconomic approach incorporated threshold effects (Hurlin, 2006). 
This study found that in the early stages of infrastructure network development, the marginal impact of 
more investment had productivity effects similar to those of investments elsewhere in the economy, 
but once the network had passed its ‘threshold size’, additional investment in the network became 
much more productive. Then, once the network passed a second threshold, the impact of further 
investment fell back to the level of other investments. 
The benchmarking approach is methodologically much simpler than the macroeconomic approach, 
and devises normalised indicators of infrastructure performance (such as road density or road 
condition) and compares them across countries, with countries divided into groups having broadly 
similar characteristics (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006), or simply compares infrastructure spending 
across countries. Benchmarking imposes fewer data requirements than macroeconomic models, other 
than requiring data for many countries to establish comparable benchmarks. The choice of indicators 
and normalisations is somewhat arbitrary and can significantly affect the results.  
Transport demand models have been used by sector specialists for more than 40 years. A detailed 
microeconomic model of an individual country’s transport sector is created and used to project 
aggregate demand for transport based on anticipated economic growth. The model allocates that 
demand across transport modes, compares demand with the capacity of each segment of the network, 
and, on that basis, estimates the additional transport infrastructure needed. Successful recent 
applications include the World Bank’s assistance to the government of China for the development of 
its transport strategy and the European Union’s development of the Trans-European Transport 
Network. The main drawback of the approach is that it is very data-intensive. 
In addition to the three economic approaches just described, it is also possible to estimate transport 
investment needs using a planning-based approach that sets targets for geographical connectivity and 
estimates the cost of reaching them. The approach, applied in World Bank advisory work in Argentina, 
China and Africa, has the advantage of reflecting the specificity of each individual country’s transport 
network. Yet unlike the previous methodology, the planning approach is very subjective, driven by 
political choices, and the targets are rarely grounded in an economic balancing of costs and benefits. 
Given the lack of data needed for a macroeconomic, transport demand or planning-based approach, the 
analyses presented here are based on a benchmarking approach. 
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2.3 Transport infrastructure benchmarks for the SEMCs 
There are two methods of deriving benchmark standards for quantities of transport infrastructure. The 
first compares densities of infrastructure with those of comparable countries, while the second uses 
international best practice for infrastructure provision or performance standards. The first method is 
preferable as it is less subjective, with the second method being subject to interpretation as to what is 
best practice.  
Data were available for using the first method for only four of the infrastructure types, albeit those 
with the highest expected investment costs (paved roads, unpaved roads, railways and airport 
runways). For two other types of infrastructure (airport passenger terminals and port berths), we used 
the second method, as there is no database of global infrastructure densities that includes these types 
of infrastructure. 
Using the first method, we have estimated benchmark values for paved roads, unpaved roads, railways 
and airport runway infrastructure, and applied those values to the SEMC region and to each of the 11 
countries. The data for the benchmarks come from a new transport and macroeconomic database of 
139 countries using data for 2008. Most of the data come from the World Bank’s Data Development 
Platform time series database. The database excludes all small island states and some small land-based 
and island states (such as Qatar and Singapore) that were considered sufficiently atypical not be used 
in the estimation of benchmarks. It also excludes Zimbabwe and Somalia for which macroeconomic 
data were not available. 
First benchmarking method 
In the first benchmarking method, the following infrastructure measures were used: 
 km of paved road, 
 km of unpaved road, 
 km of railway in operation, and 
 number of runways at airports that have regular passenger services. 
Base parameters 
Three parameters were used for the compilation of the final benchmarks:  
 land area, 
 population, and 
 total GDP. 
So benchmark values were calculated per km2 of land area, per million population2 and per US$ of 
GDP. 
Normalised benchmark values 
Previous applications of the benchmarking method have used only one of the three parameters for 
defining infrastructure density (per km2 of area, per capita or per unit of GDP), so have not dealt with 
the issue of combining multiple benchmarks into a single measure. Using different parameters to 
define infrastructure density gives significantly different outcomes. Countries that perform well using 
one parameter can perform much less well using one or both of the others. There are few if any 
conceptual indications to prefer one parameter over another.  
One of the few indications that can be applied is that area, being non-time dependent, gives more 
consistent results than either population or GDP. When using area it is not so important to determine a 
base year for its measurement, and for a given quantity of infrastructure the benchmark is constant 
over time. For either population or GDP, the choice of base year influences the measure of the 
                                                   
2 A different population parameter (number of cities) was used for the airport runway benchmark. 
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benchmark and for a given quantity of infrastructure the measure changes over time as the value of the 
parameter changes. Despite this advantage of area as a parameter for estimating benchmarks, some 
types of infrastructure (such as airport runways or port berths) are not dependent on area, so it is not 
necessarily the most appropriate parameter to use. 
To overcome problems associated with the choice of a single benchmark, which implies that the 
density of a particular type of infrastructure is dependent solely (or principally) on that single 
parameter, we have estimated benchmarks for each of the three parameters, then combined them into a 
single index of infrastructure density. Since the dimensions of the three parameters are different, 
simply adding the benchmarks for each of them gives more weight in the total to those with a higher 
value than those with a lower value. So each of the three benchmark values was normalised to a value 
of 100 (based on the global average density for that type of transport infrastructure) before they were 
added together to give a total (and by dividing by three, an average based on an index value of 100). A 
normalised index value greater than 100 indicates a higher than global average density over all three 
parameters and a value less than 100 indicates a lower than global average density over all parameters. 
Benchmarks for four scenarios 
An important choice in benchmarking is what to use as the standard of comparison. In our analysis this 
is the choice of what other countries to use for comparison with the SEMCs. We have analysed four 
scenarios and assessed the transport investment outcomes for each of them in terms of the affordability 
measured by the required share of GDP to achieve them over the period of analysis (up to 2030).  
Each of the four scenarios has different benchmark standards and costs of achieving them. The 
different standards will also have different impacts on the GDP and international trade of each of the 
11 countries. Each scenario is defined in terms of the density of its transport infrastructure and the 
standards to which it is maintained.  
The first scenario (compatible with the Sessa Reference scenario) uses a single set of standards, the 
global averages for each type of infrastructure. The premise of this scenario is that the influence of 
integration between the 11 countries and the EU would not affect their development, and that the 11 
countries would continue their integration with the rest of the world. 
The second scenario (compatible with the Sessa Common Development scenario in which the SEMCs 
and EU-27 countries become more economically and socially integrated) was designed to bring the 
transport infrastructure of the 11 SEMCs to the same as the average of the EU-27 in 2008. These are 
very high standards and have been achieved in the EU-27 after more than a century of investment in 
modern transport infrastructure and several decades of implementation of the EU transport strategy 
and policy of development of the Trans-European Transport Networks. In working through the costs 
of this scenario, we determined that it was unaffordable within the 20-year horizon to 2030 of the 
MEDPRO study.  
In these circumstances there are two choices (which in practice have a similar effect). The first is 
simply to extend the time period beyond 2030 for achievement of the scenario benchmarks; the second 
is to lower the benchmark values that can be achieved by 2030. We chose the second alternative, as 
this would at least define the benchmark values that could be achieved by 2030, whereas the first 
alternative would only provide an estimate of the future year in which the original benchmark values 
could be reached. After reviewing several versions of this alternative, we determined that it would be 
feasible to reduce the difference between the current infrastructure standards and the EU benchmark 
values by one-third by 2030. So this is how the benchmark standards for the second scenario 
(Common Development) have been defined. This standard is still significantly higher than those of 
any of the other scenarios.  
The third scenario (compatible with the Sessa Polarised scenario, in which the SEMCs become 
polarised in terms of their economic and social development) was based on rather lower standards, 
those of the average of the countries that are in the same per-capita income range as each of the 11 
SEMCs. Under this scenario, the SEMCs with higher incomes are set rather higher standards to 
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achieve than those with lower per-capita incomes. The income groups are based on the World Bank’s 
classification of countries by per-capita income into four groups: low income, low middle income, 
high middle income and high income.  
Table 3 shows the benchmark values for each type of transport infrastructure, based on each of the 
three denominator parameters. First are the densities of transport infrastructure per unit of area, second 
are the densities per capita and third are the densities per unit of GDP. The last set of values 
(‘normalised values’) is a weighted average of the first three sets of values. The last column of Table 3 
shows the current benchmark values for the SEMCs taken as a whole, giving an indication of the 
deficiencies compared with each of the benchmarks and each scenario. 
Table 3. Transport infrastructure – Benchmark values 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3  
All  
countries EU-27 
Low 
income 
Lower 
middle 
income 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
income SEMCs 
Per unit of land area (1,000 km2) 
Paved roads 170 1,054 20 182 66 363 61 
Unpaved roads 75 195 76 100 58 77 58 
Railways 8 50 3 7 6 15 4 
Runways 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Per unit of population (million) 
Paved roads 3,261 8,928 336 1,451 2,941 11,636 1,494 
Unpaved roads 1,440 1,650 1,294 799 2,609 2,466 1,419 
Railways 76 425 44 54 270 487 86 
Runways 0.97 3.81 0.29 0.31 1.46 3.15 1.56 
Per unit of GDP (US$ million) 
Paved roads 352 243 589 655 368 293 260 
Unpaved roads 156 45 2,271 361 326 62 247 
Railways 17 12 77 24 34 12 15 
Runways 0.11 0.04 0.51 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.10 
Normalised value 
Paved roads 100 301 60 107 75 209 49 
Unpaved roads 100 132 540 138 155 104 110 
Railways 100 311 169 85 145 183 61 
Runways 100 234 185 81 127 199 48 
Note. Paved roads, unpaved roads and railways are measured in kms and runways in numbers. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the author’s database. 
Second benchmarking method used for port container berths and airport 
passenger terminals 
This method involves estimating the demand for the type of infrastructure and then the quantities of 
infrastructure needed to satisfy this demand, assuming that such infrastructure utilises best practice 
design and/or operating efficiency standards appropriate to the specific scenario. 
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Port berths 
Port berths are conventionally classified as being for general, containerised, dry bulk and liquid bulk 
freight. We have only estimated the demand for container berths and assumed that no additional 
general freight berths will be required. Dry and liquid bulk berths are usually provided to complement 
specific agricultural, mining or industrial projects. Since we have not looked at specific investments 
outside of the transport sector, we did not have a basis on which to project the needs for additional 
bulk solid and bulk liquid berths, so in that respect the projected overall investment requirements are 
underestimated.  
While there are many efficiency parameters for the use of container berths, one of the simplest and 
most applicable to our analytical method is the number of containers moved per year per berth. Port 
efficiencies measured by this parameter have improved significantly in the last decade, but this has 
mostly been through inefficient ports coming closer to the best practice efficiency than there being 
increases in the best practice efficiency. Using the standard measure of a TEU,3 the efficient capacity 
of a standard berth of 300 metres in length varies between about 175,000 TEU per year and 400,000 
TEU per year depending on the scenario.  
We have no reliable and consistent data on the current number of container berths in the ports of the 
SEMCs, and even less data on the proportion of this capacity that is taken up by transhipment 
movements (the transfer of a container from one ship to another via intermediate land storage). So we 
have assumed that existing container berth capacity is equivalent to the current demand, and have only 
estimated the additional capacity to deal with increases in demand over the analysis period.  
The number of additional container berths needed for each scenario is based on the number of import 
and export containers. This is in turn is based on the total share of trade that is for imports and exports, 
the share of that trade attributable to land transport, roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) shipping (which does not 
use containers) and bulk solid and bulk liquid freight (which also do not use containers), the average 
value of the contents of a container, and the balance between import and export containers (as an 
estimate of the number of empty containers to be returned). While the projections of GDP do not yet 
take account of the differences among the scenarios, the estimates of the share of trade between 
imports and exports, and the share of ro-ro and land transport all entail minor differences for some of 
the scenarios.  
Although scenario 4 has a lower demand for container movements than the other scenarios, its lower 
efficiency in the use of its container terminals is more than enough to offset this apparent advantage in 
the number of additional berths needed. The Reference scenario has a need for more container 
terminals than either the Common Development or Failed Development scenarios, but not as many as 
the Polarised Development one. The Polarised Development scenario needs more berths because of 
the higher share of intra-Arab country trade, which also requires a large number of berths for feeder 
vessels. 
Airport passenger terminals 
For many airports the critical capacity constraint is no longer the number of runways but the capacity 
of the passenger terminals. We have projected the number of air passenger movements in each of the 
SEMCs (taking account of projections of GDP and foreign direct investment (FDI) as the basis for 
business passenger growth and where available, national projections of increases in tourism as the 
basis for non-business passenger growth) and translated this demand into that for airport passenger 
terminals. A commonly used design parameter for airports is the terminal space for each peak-period 
                                                   
3 TEU is an acronym signifying a 20ft equivalent unit. It is an inexact unit of cargo based on the volume of a 20-
ft-long (6.1 m) container. While 20ft-long containers were until recently the most frequently used (although their 
other dimensions were less standardised), they have now been superseded by 40ft-long containers, sometimes 
referred to as FEUs. Nevertheless, the TEU is still the standard measure of capacity used in maritime transport. 
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air passenger. With an estimate of the number of peak-period air passengers, we have used this design 
parameter to estimate the area of air passenger terminals that are needed for each country. 
Since we have no reliable and consistent data on the area of passenger terminals in each country, we 
have adopted a similar analytical method to that for container berths – assuming that the current 
terminal space exactly matches the current demand. We then apply the design benchmark parameters 
only to the projected increase in demand.  
The quantities of new air passenger terminals are more consistent among the countries than for most 
other types of infrastructure. While business passengers to/from lower-income countries tend look for 
the same standards in air passenger terminals as in developed countries, non-business passengers tend 
to tolerate a slightly lower quality of terminal infrastructure. So in our scenario analysis, the parameter 
for the provision of area of air passenger terminals is the same for all scenarios, but the unit cost per 
m2 is slightly lower than the global standards to take account of the slightly lower infrastructure 
quality tolerated by non-business passengers to the SEMCs. 
2.4 Summary of additional transport infrastructure for each 
scenario 
The quantities of all types of additional infrastructure are summarised in Table 4. These are the 
infrastructure needs that are taken forward into section 3 of this report, where we estimate the costs of 
improving, upgrading, expanding and maintaining the infrastructure networks. 
The Common Development scenario is the most demanding for paved roads, railways, runways and to 
a lesser extent, for air passenger terminals. For unpaved roads and container terminals, the Polarised 
Development scenario is the most demanding. 
Table 4. Summary of additions to transport infrastructure for each scenario 
Type of  
infrastructure Units 
Reference 
scenario 
Common 
Development 
Polarised 
Development 
Failed  
Development 
Paved roads km 174,436 307,145 301,234 118,918 
Unpaved roads km 32,296 58,995 88,313 30,152 
Railways km 4,274 16,452 4,709 2,246 
Runways km 11 92 17 7 
Passenger terminals m2 888,062 976,869 888,062 732,652 
Container berths number 45 42 64 38 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Table 3. 
3. Transport infrastructure investment – Costs and affordability 
In this section of the report we describe the method of estimating the four principal costs of operating 
transport infrastructure networks – bringing their condition to a standard that minimises total 
investment costs, upgrades their category to provide sufficient capacity, minimises operating costs, 
expands the networks, and maintains the improved, upgraded and expanded networks in good 
condition. We express the investment costs for each of the four scenarios as absolute amounts and as a 
percentage of projected GDP, as this indicates whether the investment needed will be affordable. 
3.1 Quantities of transport infrastructure 
At the end of section 2, we indicated the additional quantities of transport infrastructure required to 
meet the benchmark standards for four different scenarios and for six types of transport infrastructure. 
When added to the data or estimates of currently existing transport infrastructure, the totals give the 
quantities that are used in this section of the report to estimate the investment needs. In Table 5 we 
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show the total quantities of each type of transport infrastructure for each scenario, these totals being 
the sum of existing infrastructure and the additions needed for each scenario. 
Table 5. Total transport infrastructure for each scenario 
Type of 
Infrastructure Units 
Reference 
scenario 
Common 
Development 
Polarised 
Development 
Failed  
Development 
Paved roads km 590,442 723,151 717,240 534,924 
Unpaved roads km 428,495 455,194 484,512 426,351 
Railways km 28,895 41,073 29,330 26,867 
Runways km 164 245 170 160 
Passenger 
terminals m
2 1,575,407 1,664,214 1,575,407 1,419,997 
Container berths number 126 123 145 119 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
3.2 Types of transport infrastructure investment 
For each of the scenarios we estimated four different types of infrastructure costs, as discussed below. 
i) Improving the condition of infrastructure 
First are the costs of improving the condition of the current transport infrastructure, so as to minimise 
maintenance costs of the infrastructure itself and the operating costs of the vehicles using it. We 
obtained estimates of, or made assumptions about, the quantity of the current infrastructure in each 
country, in terms of being in good, fair or poor condition. To estimate the cost of bringing 
infrastructure in fair or poor condition up to good condition, we multiplied the quantities of such 
infrastructure by the unit costs of improvement – a one-time cost that can be incurred at any time but 
preferably as soon as possible and before other types of investment. 
ii) Upgrading categories of infrastructure 
Second are the costs of upgrading the category of existing transport infrastructure to a level adequate 
to the demands made upon it. Representative activities are widening existing roads or upgrading their 
surface, lengthening airport runways and expanding port berths, and increasing the permissible axle 
load of railways. We categorise infrastructure by its capacity or level of development. The essential 
question is whether a piece of infrastructure has the capacity to meet the demands made upon it. Some 
infrastructure is already adequate. For example, many of the roads already have at least two lanes and 
hard shoulders giving them adequate capacity. For other roads, the capacity of existing infrastructure 
is insufficient, such as roads connecting large cities that have enough traffic to justify four or more 
lanes but presently have only two, railway networks that have not been fully updated to support 25-ton 
axle loads and airports in some medium-sized cities that have runways that are too short for mid-size 
aircraft, such as the Airbus A320 or Boeing 737. Such deficiencies are found with respect to all 
transport modes and markets.  
We made our own specifications of the desirable categories of infrastructure that are appropriate for 
each mode and market, based on international standards of best practice. Where the total transport 
investment costs turn out to be unacceptably high, it might be possible to relax some of the standards 
to give lower investment costs, but this would result in higher operating costs.  
We have used engineering estimates of the costs of upgrading each category of infrastructure to the 
next highest level, but such estimates assume that the infrastructure being upgraded is already in good 
condition. For that reason, we estimated the cost of upgrading infrastructure in two stages – first 
improving its condition to a good level in its present category, and then upgrading it to the next 
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category. In practice, these operations often occur together, but we believe that our two-stage approach 
accurately reflects the higher cost of upgrading infrastructure that is in less-than-good condition. 
The current condition of transport infrastructure can be assessed in several ways. The simplest is for 
the engineers responsible for maintaining the infrastructure to make a subjective assessment, usually in 
some combination of the categories very good, good, regular or fair, poor and very poor. The second is 
to use a more objective method, such as the use of the international roughness index (IRI) for roads. 
The IRI defines the method and equipment to be used to measure the roughness of the road surface, 
and then these measurements are used to calculate a roughness index for the road, with the index being 
scaled between one and ten. Sometimes equivalence between the subjective measures and the IRI is 
used, so that particular values of subjective assessments are considered to be comparable with 
particular value ranges of the IRI.  
A third method, sometimes used for rail track, is to equate particular combinations of speed and axle 
load restrictions to subjective assessments. For example, a rail track with no such restrictions would be 
assessed as being in excellent condition, whereas one where a 20% speed restriction on the design 
speed (whether that design speed were 150 km/hr or 60 km/hr) would be assessed as being in good 
condition, a higher speed restriction would relegate the conditions to fair or regular and an axle load 
restriction would relegate the condition to poor or very poor. So far as we are aware, there are no 
formal objective categorisations of the condition of airport runways, but the subjective method is 
sometimes used. By some subjective methods, runways in anything other less than fair or regular 
condition are unsafe and should not be used. 
iii) Extending the length of networks or increasing the number of facilities 
Third are the costs of extending existing networks and increasing the number of infrastructure assets. 
The method of estimating the expansion of transport networks to meet global intensity is described in 
section 2 of this report. The costs of expansion were estimated by multiplying the quantities of 
additional infrastructure indicated by this method by the unit costs of providing new infrastructure. 
The unit costs were derived from recent projects and studies in countries of the region, including 
recent EuroMed studies. 
iv) Maintaining infrastructure 
Fourth, we estimated the costs of maintaining networks and assets in their improved, upgraded or 
expanded forms. The poor condition of transport infrastructure in the SEMCs reflects insufficient 
investment in maintenance. Unless sufficient investment is allocated to maintenance, the benefits of 
improving the condition, upgrading the category or expanding the quantity of transport infrastructure 
will be temporary. The belated realisation of the importance of maintenance is the driving force behind 
the creation in some countries of road funds that enjoy dedicated, protected sources of funding. 
Most previous assessments of investment needs for transport infrastructure made some attempt to 
include maintenance costs. The most common method is to add a fixed amount (often 3%) of the 
replacement cost of the infrastructure. Yet, very few countries invest anywhere near this amount to 
keep their transport infrastructure in good condition, although many at least maintain it in safe 
condition. The most common consequences of lower standards of maintenance are lower operating 
speeds and higher costs of maintaining the vehicles that use the infrastructure.  
If rail track is not maintained in good condition, for example, with regular replacement of ballast, 
sleepers, fastenings and worn rail (broken rails that impair operational safety are usually replaced as 
necessary), the first consequence is a reduction in operating speeds, followed by a reduction in axle 
loads and possibly further reductions in speed. The railway company incurs higher operating and 
capital costs as well. For example, because trains take more time to cover the same distance, crew 
costs are higher. Lower axle loads mean that more cars are needed to transport the same quantity of 
freight. These higher costs may quickly come to exceed the savings realised by reducing investment in 
maintenance. 
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For most transport infrastructure we considered two types of maintenance – annual and periodic. 
Annual maintenance is done to avoid or minimise the deterioration of infrastructure related to climate 
and weather. For example, annual maintenance includes the clearing of drains to ensure that water 
does not accumulate on and eventually seep into the surface of the infrastructure, thus accelerating its 
deterioration. For a railway, annual maintenance includes the replacement of broken fastenings, so 
sleepers can continue to withstand the pressure of trains and maintain the correct distance between the 
rails.  
Periodic maintenance is usually related to the effects of infrastructure use. For example, the constant 
passage of vehicles will in time wear away the surface of a road. If the surface is not replaced, the 
subsurface will become worn and require rehabilitation or replacement. The passage of trains similarly 
causes the rails to wear. Worn rails increase the risk of derailments. 
We take the costs of both types of maintenance into account but convert periodic costs to annual 
equivalents by dividing their cost by their estimated frequency. We estimate the frequency of periodic 
maintenance based on average volumes of traffic using the infrastructure. Although similar 
considerations apply to port berths, the time between periodic maintenance interventions is usually 
much longer than for other transport modes and thus depends less on use than on elapsed time. 
3.3 Unit costs of infrastructure investment 
The total cost of each of the four types of infrastructure investment is estimated by multiplying the 
quantities of infrastructure of each type by the unit costs of improvement, upgrading, expansion and 
maintenance. The final, overall total cost is derived by adding together the totals for each type of 
activity. 
Sources of unit cost information 
The unit costs are derived from various sources, and for all of them the costs have been adjusted to 
end-2010 values and expressed in US$. Where possible, unit costs from one source have been checked 
against those from another. The first source is the various studies undertaken between 2004 and 2006 
for the EuroMed project. Most of these had a base year of 2004 for their costs and were pre-feasibility 
studies, for which the costs are typically about 20% to 30% lower than those that will be incurred 
when (and if) the project is implemented. So for the unit costs from these studies we have, in addition 
to updating the base year from 2004 to 2010, further adjusted the costs upwards by 20% to bring them 
closer to those that might actually be incurred. A second source is the World Bank ROCKS (Road 
Costs Knowledge System) database.4 This only includes costs for road projects, but the data are the 
costs actually incurred in the implementation of World Bank road projects. The base year for the data 
is 2002, so their reliability, even when updated to a 2010 base, is questionable. 
Unit costs of improvements to transport infrastructure 
Three other sources of data derive from the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 
(AICD). First is Background Paper 11 (AICD, 2008), Unit Costs of Infrastructure Projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This provides a range of unit costs for some rather general activities, including the 
new construction of paved roads (the category of the roads is not distinguished, but the length of the 
project was found to influence the cost, with longer projects having higher unit costs). As with the 
ROCKS database, the average costs in AICD (2008) are those actually incurred in implementing 
projects, so no adjustment for being pre-feasibility estimates was necessary, and since the base year 
was 2006, the updating to 2010 prices is more reliable than that for the ROCKS data. AICD 
Background Paper 14 by Gwilliam et al. (2008), The Burden of Maintenance: Roads in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, also relates only to roads, but gives the overall cost of different types of road maintenance for 
each of the 44 countries included in the Diagnostic, and from these and other data provided, it is 
                                                   
4 The database is at http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rd_tools/rocks_main.htm. 
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possible to estimate the unit costs of various maintenance activities. Unfortunately, these average costs 
are for the whole road network and not just for those sections for which the total costs were estimated. 
The third and most comprehensive from this source is Carruthers et al. (2008). This source provides 
unit costs for four transport modes (roads, railways, ports and airports) and for each of the four 
investment activities used here.  
Most of the unit costs shown in Tables 6 through 9 are based on those of the EuroMed studies and 
Carruthers et al. (2008), adjusted to take account of slightly different rates for some activities, for 
inflation and for the difference between estimated and actual costs. 
Table 6. Unit costs of improvements to transport infrastructure 
Type of infrastructure 
Improvement categories 
Good to very good Fair to very good Poor to very good 
 US$ per km or per unit 
4-lane road 25,000 150,000 350,000 
2-lane road 10,000 70,000 150,000 
1-lane 7,500 50,000 100,000 
Unpaved road 5,000 10,000 25,000 
Single track railway 50,000 500,000 500,000 
Double track railway 75,000 750,000 1,00,000 
Single track electric railway 125,000 750,000 1,250,000 
1,500 m runway 150,000 750,000 3,000,000 
3,000 m runway 250,000 1,500,000 6,000,000 
Container berth 2,500,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 
Bulk berth 2,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 
General berth 1,500,000 8,000,000 8,000,000 
Air passenger terminal (m2) 100 250 500 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Unit costs of upgrading the categories of transport infrastructure 
The only source of information on the categories of transport infrastructure in the 11 SEMCs is the 
EuroMed studies. Unfortunately, these data relate to 2004 and significant upgrading of much of the 
infrastructure has taken place since then. We have used our own knowledge of specific recent 
upgrading projects to update the data of Carruthers et al. (2008) using those from the EuroMed studies. 
The categories used for each type of transport infrastructure are specific to that mode and related to the 
different types of infrastructure available. The categories usually relate to capacity but sometimes to 
method of construction. For example, for scenario 1 at the end of the period, 10% of all paved roads 
should be four-lane divided highways, 20% should be four-lane highways but without limited access, 
60% should be two-lane and the balance (10%) could remain as single-lane highways. For countries in 
which the percentages are already met for specific types of infrastructure, no additional investment is 
assumed to be needed for upgrading categories. There will be many instances where new investment 
will be needed to reduce congestion (for example, six-lane or more divided highways in urban areas) 
but without undertaking specific demand analyses we cannot assess the needs for this additional 
investment. 
The unit costs of upgrading existing infrastructure to the higher categories is less than that of 
constructing new infrastructure to that standard, but it is more than the difference between 
constructing new to the higher and lower standards. Table 7 shows the unit costs of upgrading 
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infrastructure from its current category to the specified higher categories. For railways, some of the 
upgrading requires a combination of unit costs, such as for electrification and increasing axle loads. 
Table 7. Unit costs of upgrading categories of transport infrastructure 
Upgrade Unit Unit cost (US$) 
2-lane to 4-lane divided limited access US$/km 1,500,000 
2-lane to 4-lane divided US$/km 1,200,000 
1-lane to 2-lane  US$/km 200,000 
1-lane gravel to 1-lane paved US$/km 100,000 
1-lane gravel to 2-lane SST US$/km 100,000 
Railways axle load to 25 tons US$/track km 120,000 
Non-electrified to electrified railway US$/track km 750,000 
Single track to double track diesel US$/track km 750,000 
Gravel runway to paved runway US$ per linear m 5,000 
1,524 m paved runway to 3,000 m runway US$ per runway 12,000,000 
1,000 m paved runway to 1,524 m runway US$ per runway 4,800,000 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Unit costs of new infrastructure 
The future lengths or quantities of transport infrastructure were based on the benchmarking method 
described in section 2. The unit costs of new construction shown in Table 8 were applied to the 
difference between the benchmark lengths/quantities and those currently available to estimate the costs 
of expanding the networks to meet the benchmark standards. 
Table 8. Unit costs of new infrastructure 
Type of infrastructure Unit Unit cost (US$) 
4-lane divided paved road US$/km 3,500,000 
2-lane paved road US$/km 1,000,000 
1-lane paved road US$/km 150,000 
Railway single track, 25t axle load, diesel US$/km 750,000 
Railway single track, 25t axle load, electric US$/km 1,000,000 
Railway signalling US$/km 350,000 
Airport runway, 3000m US$/m 30,000,000 
Airport passenger terminal US$/m2 500 
Container berth US$/berth of 300m 16,000,000 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Unit costs of maintaining transport infrastructure 
Most countries, and almost all developing countries, do not invest enough in maintenance of their 
transport infrastructure to prevent its condition deteriorating over time. The standards to which 
infrastructure should be upgraded are the same for the first three scenarios, but since scenario 4 is 
resource-constrained (to the recent percentage of GDP that has been invested in transport 
infrastructure) the standards to which infrastructure can be maintained are less than the ‘very good’ of 
the other scenarios and are different for each country. 
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Unit costs of routine and periodic maintenance 
There are two types of maintenance needed for most types of transport infrastructure, annual and 
periodic. The periodicity of the latter depends on the particular infrastructure and the intensity of its 
use.  
For example, road pavements are usually designed for a life measured in equivalent axle loads 
(EQAs), since it is the frequency of these axle loads that determine when a road needs a new surface. 
We have derived an average frequency measured in years based on the average traffic density and 
composition and EQAs per vehicle. 
Given a 20-year analysis period, there would on average be two and a half periodic maintenance 
activities for each paved road, three for each unpaved road, four reballastings for each rail track and 
two resurfacings for each runway. We have not included the cost of re-railing or re-sleepering of rail 
track because of their long periodicity and the fact that we have already included these unit costs in 
those of improving and upgrading. These costs have been applied to all transport infrastructure – the 
current infrastructure that will have been improved and upgraded as well as the new. 
Table 9. Unit costs of periodic maintenance 
Periodic activity Unit Total cost in US$ Periodicity 
Annual cost 
in US$ 
Resurfacing a 4-lane road US$/km 1,000,000 8 125,000 
Resurfacing a 2-lane road US$/km 50,000 8 6,250 
Reballasting a railway US$/track km 15,000 5 3,000 
Resurfacing a runway US$/runway 5,000,000 10 500,000 
Rehabilitating a container berth  US$/berth 10,000,000 10 1,000,000 
Refurbishing an air passenger terminal US$/m2 200 5 40 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
3.4 Results of the cost analysis 
The results of the analysis are shown in two parts. The first part reviews the total expected investment 
by country and type of expenditure and the shares of total investments by country. The second part 
reviews the investment by country and mode of investment. Both parts cover all four scenarios. The 
subsequent section addresses the affordability of these investments. 
Total investment costs and types of investment 
In Table 10 we compare the total investment costs by type of expenditure for each scenario. Total 
investment in the Reference scenario is almost $675 billion over the 20-year analysis period, with an 
average of nearly $34 billion per year. The Failed Development scenario not surprisingly has the 
lowest total investment, just over $500 billion over the 20 years, or just over $26 billion per year, 
about three-quarters of that in the Reference scenario. In section 2, we saw that the investment 
demands of the Common Development scenario would be very high and this is confirmed in Table 10, 
which shows that even with the reduced objective (reducing the difference between the current and 
EU-27 benchmark values by one-third) more than $1,200 billion would be needed for the 11 SEMCs 
to achieve the benchmark standards. Spread over a period of 20 years this would require an annual 
investment of more than $60 billion, about double that of the Reference scenario. The Polarised 
Development scenario would require a total of more than $900 million, equivalent to $45 billion per 
year, about one-third more than for the Reference scenario.  
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Table 10. Investment total and shares by type of activity 
Scenario Maintenance Upgrading Improvement Expansion Total 
 Total investment (US$ billion) 
Reference 306 61 112 195 674 
Common Development 381 111 133 588 1,213 
Polarised Development 362 61 137 343 903 
Failed Development 238 56 69 147 510 
  Annual investment (US$ billion) 
Reference 15.3 3.0 5.6 9.8 33.7 
Common Development 19.0 5.5 6.7 29.4 60.6 
Polarised Development 18.1 3.0 6.9 17.1 45.1 
Failed Development 11.9 2.8 3.4 7.4 25.5 
  Share of total investment (%) 
Reference 45 9 17 29 100 
Common Development 31 9 11 48 100 
Polarised Development 40 7 15 38 100 
Failed Development 47 11 13 29 100 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
In all the scenarios the maintenance share is high, more than 45% of the total in the Reference and 
Failed Development scenarios, about 40% in the Polarised Development scenario and more than 30% 
in the Common Development scenario. Although the Common Development scenario has the lowest 
share of investment in maintenance, it has the highest actual investment. Despite the benchmark 
standards for the Common Development scenario having been reduced, this scenario still requires 
almost 50% of investment in new infrastructure. In contrast, the Failed Development and Reference 
scenarios need only 29% of their investment in new facilities. The Failed Development scenario 
compensates by having high investment shares in upgrading (11%) the existing infrastructure. 
Investments by country 
When the investments by country are considered, scenario 2 (Common Development) is significantly 
different from the other three. In scenario 2 there is little variation in the shares of investment allocated 
to expansion, the lowest share being 49% (Palestine) and the highest being 70% (Algeria). Given that 
the expansion shares do not show much variation and are relatively high, the country shares of the 
other types of expenditures also show little variation.  
In the Reference and Polarised Development scenarios, the ranges of expansion investment vary from 
42% (Egypt) to 0.5% (Palestine) and from 31% (also Egypt) to 0% (also Palestine) respectively. 
Palestine has no need for investment in expansion for scenarios 1, 3 and 4, as its paved and unpaved 
road densities already exceed the benchmarks for those scenarios, and as it currently has no ports, 
railways or airports we do not allocate any expansion investment to those infrastructures. Palestine is 
currently planning to build a rail network, however, and until the second Intifada (2000 to 2005) was 
well advanced on plans to build both a port and an airport. None of these developments are included in 
our scenarios, as their economic and financial viability has not been assessed. 
In the Reference scenario, three countries (Algeria, Egypt and Turkey) would account for about 70% 
of the total investment, leaving the remaining 30% for the other eight countries. Turkey alone would 
account for one-third of the total. At the other end of the scale, Lebanon and Palestine would each 
require only about 1% of the total, with Israel and Jordan requiring only 2% each. 
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Turkey accounts for the highest share of investment in all four scenarios, consistently with more than 
one-third of the total. Algeria and Egypt have the next highest shares (of between 10% and 20%), but 
show more variation among the scenarios: Egypt has a higher share in scenarios 1, 3 and 4 and Algeria 
has a slightly higher share in scenario 2. Palestine consistently has the lowest share, ranging between 
only one-third and one-half of 1% of the total. Libya has the widest range in its investment share, from 
a low of just over 5% in the Reference scenario to more than 12% in the Polarised Development 
scenario (Table 11). 
Table 11. Country shares of total investment (%) 
 
Reference 
scenario 
Common  
Development 
Polarised  
Development 
Failed  
Development 
Algeria 16.7 16.5 9.8 14.6 
Egypt 20.0 15.9 19.5 16.8 
Israel 2.1 2.4 1.6 2.7 
Jordan 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Lebanon 0.8 1.1 0.6 1.0 
Libya 5.5 8.9 12.6 9.7 
Morocco 9.3 8.6 8.8 8.5 
Syria 5.8 5.0 5.9 5.6 
Tunisia 4.1 3.6 2.6 3.4 
Turkey 33.0 35.7 36.0 34.9 
Palestine 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.7 
11 SEMCs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
In the Common Development scenario, the total investment of more than $3,500 billion would have a 
similar distribution, but Turkey would account for a slightly larger share and Egypt a slightly smaller 
share than in the Reference scenario. Palestine’s share would reduce to a little more than half of the 
0.5% of the Reference scenario. Investment would remain heavily concentrated in Turkey, Algeria and 
Egypt, with these three countries accounting for about 68% of the total. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Palestine would account for the smallest share of the total, only about 6% of the total between them.  
The Polarised Development scenario gives Egypt and Libya their largest shares of the four scenarios, 
nearly 20% for Egypt and nearly 13% for Libya. Syria and Jordan also have their largest shares in this 
scenario, but not by such large differences compared with the other scenarios. Part of the reason for 
the larger shares of these countries in the Polarised scenario is their role as transit countries in higher 
trade among the SEMCs rather than with the EU-27. 
Despite having the lowest total investment, the shares of that total among countries in the Failed 
Development scenario are not very different from those in the Reference scenario. Algeria and Egypt 
have slightly lower shares, while Libya has a rather higher share and Turkey a slightly higher share. 
The shares of all the other countries differ from those of the Reference scenario by less than 1%. 
Investment by mode 
There are two ways of looking at mode shares. The first is to see the total investment in each mode, 
and this is shown in the first part of Table 12 for the four scenarios. The second way is based on the 
share of investment in each mode, and this is shown in the second part of Table 12. Although there are 
significant differences in the total investments in each mode, the shares of investment going to each 
mode are remarkably similar among scenarios, with there being a 3% or difference in modal shares. 
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Table 12. Total investment by mode and mode shares for the SEMCs for each scenario 
Scenario Roads Railways Airports Ports Total 
 Total investment (US$ m) 
Reference 600,018 37,111 24,585 11,859 673,574 
Common Development 1,097,044 67,509 36,398 11,585 1,212,537 
Polarised Development 826,171 37,146 25,440 13,759 902,515 
Failed Development 600,018 37,111 24,585 11,859 510,343 
 Share of investment (% of total) 
Reference 89 6 4 2 100 
Common Development 90 6 3 1 100 
Polarised Development 92 4 3 2 100 
Failed Development 89 6 4 2 100 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Paved and unpaved roads 
Roads account for the highest share of investment in all scenarios, with the lowest share being 89% in 
the Reference and Failed Development scenarios and the highest being in the Polarised Development 
scenario at 92%. With this very high share, there is little opportunity for the shares of the other modes 
to show much variation. 
Railways 
While the railways’ share only varies between 4% and 6% of the total, the actual investment varies 
between $37 billion in the Reference, Polarised and Failed Development scenarios and more than $67 
billion in the Common Development scenario. Although the rail investment is highest in the Common 
Development scenario, its share of investment is similar to those of the Reference and Failed 
Development scenarios. 
Airports 
The pattern for airport runways and passenger terminals is similar to that of railways, which is a very 
high investment in the Common Development scenario (more than $37 billion for runways and 
terminals taken together) and lower but similar investment levels in the other scenarios (about $25 
billion). 
Port berths 
The investment needed in port berths (expansion alone for container berths but also improvement, 
upgrading and maintenance for general freight berths) is similar in all four scenarios at about $12 
billion, although the Polarised Development scenario has about $2 billion more. The Common 
Development scenario does not have much higher investments than the other scenarios, as we have 
assumed that the scenario will include a large increase in the ro-ro share of the SEMCs for EU-27 
trade and this will detract from the container share. This scenario additionally has the highest 
efficiency in the use of container berths, also contributing to a lower need for investment. 
Modal investments by country 
The only three modes that display significant differences in the scenarios in terms of the share of 
modal investments among countries are paved roads, unpaved roads and railways. For these three 
modes, Turkey would require more than one-third of the total investments, except for unpaved roads 
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and railways in the Polarised Development scenario, where the shares would fall to about 21% and 
26% respectively. 
For paved roads, Algeria’s share would be about 17% except in the Polarised Development scenario, 
where it would fall to about 7%. Egypt’s share would fall from about 20% in the Reference scenario to 
15% in the Common Development scenario. Libya’s share of paved road investment is the most 
variable among the scenarios, with 6% in the Reference scenario, rising to 10% in the Common 
Development scenario and to 14% in Polarised Development, but falling to 11% in the Failed 
Development scenario. Israel, Jordan and Lebanon would have consistently low shares of paved road 
investment, at 3%, 2% and 1% respectively. Morocco would take about 10% of the paved road 
investment in all scenarios, while Syria would require a consistent 5% and Tunisia a consistent share 
of between 2% and 4%.  
Algeria’s share of unpaved road investment would increase from an average of about 22% in the 
Reference scenario to more than 29% in the Polarised Development scenario. Egypt’s share would be 
about 20% in the first three scenarios, reducing slightly to 16% in the Failed Development scenario. 
Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine require little or no investment in unpaved roads, Libya and 
Tunisia about 5%, Morocco about 10% (other than in the Reference scenario, where it would only 
require 4% of the total). 
After Turkey, Algeria and Egypt would need the next greatest share of railway investment, at about 
20% each. Algeria’s share would increase to over 30% in the Polarised Development scenario. Syria 
and Tunisia would each require about 6% to 7% in all the scenarios, with the other countries sharing 
the remainder at between 0% (Palestine and Libya, as they currently do not have railways) and 2% 
(Jordan). 
For container berths we have only included the costs of the infrastructure and not the superstructure. 
The latter includes all the container handling equipment and is usually provided by the terminal 
operator, now invariably under a concession agreement. Superstructure is not included in any transport 
infrastructure. The port share is small as it is only container berths. We have not had the opportunity to 
analyse all the data for bulk solid and bulk liquid berths, but most of the investment in these is 
provided by the private sector. 
3.5 Affordability of total transport investments 
While total investment in transport is an important indicator of how much investment is needed, it 
does not reflect how affordable that investment would be. For that we look at the investment as a share 
of GDP. This is reflected in Table 13. 
While being an important concept, affordability in terms of investment as a share of income does not 
have any objective specification – what could be affordable to one country might not be to another that 
has different economic and social objectives. One criterion that is often used to assess affordability is 
to compare the investment with what share of investment is actually incurred in other countries, and 
this comparison is made in the next section. Anticipating the conclusions from this section, investment 
of more than 2% of GDP has not been maintained consistently by any country, although about one-
third of the reporting countries have invested more than 1% for at least a decade. 
The Common Development scenario would require all countries other than Israel to invest 2% of GDP 
or more in transport infrastructure, while in the Reference scenario this level of investment would only 
be needed by Algeria and Morocco. Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Syria would need at least this 
level of investment in the Polarised Development scenario, while none of the countries would need it 
in the Failed Development scenario.  
The only country/scenario combinations that would need more than 4% of GDP (and therefore perhaps 
be financially infeasible) would be Algeria and Libya in the Common Development scenario and 
Libya in the Polarised Development scenario. 
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Table 13. Transport investment as a share of GDP (%) 
 Reference Common Polarised Failed 
Algeria 2.1 4.5 1.7 1.4 
Egypt 1.6 2.3 2.1 1.0 
Israel 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 
Jordan 1.5 2.6 2.0 1.0 
Lebanon 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.4 
Libya 1.3 4.3 4.0 1.7 
Morocco 2.0 3.8 2.6 1.3 
Syria 1.9 2.5 2.7 1.4 
Tunisia 1.8 3.1 1.5 1.1 
Turkey 0.9 2.1 1.3 0.7 
Palestine 1.5 3.0 1.5 1.4 
11 SEMCs 1.2 2.4 1.6 0.9 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
3.6 International comparisons of transport investment  
The International Transport Forum (ITF produces an annual report on transport investment as a share 
of GDP by those of its member countries that provided data. About 41 countries have provided more 
or less complete data for at least three of the last ten years. 
The latest of these reports (ITF, 2011) shows that Western European countries reduced their transport 
investment share of GDP from about 1.5% of GDP in the 1970s to about 1% of GDP in the 1980s, and 
had reduced the share to about 0.8% by this last decade. By 2009, Denmark had the lowest share at 
about 0.5% and Spain the highest at about 1.1%. 
Interpolating the available data for the last decade, it appears that three countries invested more than 
2% of GDP in transport – Japan, Albania and Croatia. Japan’s high average conceals a rapid decline, 
from more than 3.7% in 2000 to less than 0.6% in 2009. A further three countries (Latvia, Italy and the 
Czech Republic) invested between 1.5% and 2.0% of GDP. Thirteen more countries invested more 
than 1% of GDP and 22 more countries between 0.5% and 1% of GDP. The average of these 41 
countries was 1.0% of GDP. The only SEMC included in the ITF dataset is Turkey, which invested 
only between 0.3% and 0.5% of its GDP in transport in each reported year between 2000 and 2009. 
Although the ITF data do distinguish between new investment and maintenance, within new 
investment they do not distinguish between investment in new facilities (in our terminology network 
expansion), improving condition and upgrading categories. Even for maintenance, its data are very 
incomplete.  
Also, most of the ITF members that do report data are developed countries that have been investing in 
their transport infrastructure for centuries, whereas most of the 11 SEMCs are still developing and 
have only been investing seriously in transport infrastructure since their independence or since the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire by the end of the First World War. So the ITF members do not have 
the same need to invest in basic transport infrastructure. This difference is reflected in the normalised 
infrastructure densities for the SEMCs and EU-27 countries. 
Mode shares 
In the Western European countries, the share of investment in road infrastructure has declined slowly 
with a gradual increase in rail investment. While the share of road investment amounted to close to 
80% in Western Europe in 1975, figures for 2009 put it at 66% of total investment in transport 
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infrastructure. The share of inland waterways has remained at a constant 2% in recent years. The share 
of rail investment is particularly high in Austria (65%), the United Kingdom (55%), Luxembourg 
(52%), Sweden (45%) and Belgium (41%). The trend observed in our data for Western Europe is 
partly a reflection of the political commitment to the railways.  
Transport investment in other regions 
The transport investment shares of GDP for the SEMCs are comparable with those of the lower 
middle-income countries of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) (Carruthers et al., 2008). This World Bank 
(AICD) study on transport infrastructure produced broadly similar results for the 44 countries included 
in its study as our analysis of the 11 SEMCs. Table 14 shows the investment shares of GDP projected 
in the AICD study for the SSA countries. The study used two scenarios. The standards in the “base” 
scenario (compatible with those used in our study but based on a connectivity approach) were 
considered unaffordable for the lowest income countries, so alternative lower standards were assessed 
in what was called a “pragmatic” scenario. These lower standards are not relevant to our analyses, as 
none of the SEMCs are low income or economically and socially fragile as defined in the AICD study. 
Table 14. Projected investment in transport infrastructure for Sub-Saharan Africa (% of GDP) 
Country group Base scenario Pragmatic scenario 
Low-income (fragile) 8.2 4.8 
Low-income (not fragile) 2.9 1.7 
Resource-rich 1.7 1.0 
Middle-income 0.7 0.4 
Average for all Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 1.2 
Source: Carruthers et al. (2008). 
For the base scenario, the average shares of GDP for the resource-rich and middle-income (all of 
which are low middle-income countries) were 1.7% and 0.7% respectively.  
Unlike the ITF countries that already have well-developed transport networks, the 11 SEMCs and SSA 
countries are still at the stage of development and so need investment particularly in upgrading and 
expansion. 
For the 11 SEMCs, the share of total investment allocated to expansion of the transport networks is 
relatively small (between 20% and 40% of the total, overlooking the Common Development scenario 
where network expansion would require almost 70% of the total investment, despite the quite 
extensive additional infrastructure needed to reach the benchmark targets as shown in Table 4 in 
section 2. 
Routine and periodic maintenance expenditure would account for the largest share by type of activity, 
at 40% to 50%; however, closer examination of the ITF results shows that much of the maintenance 
expenditure is missing, whereas that for new investment appears to be complete, so the maintenance 
share is under-reported.  
When the improvement share (about 20%), which is really deferred maintenance, is added to that of 
routine and periodic maintenance, the share comes to about 60%. This is closer to the share estimated 
for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries in the World Bank study. 
Maintenance share of transport investment in developed countries 
The balance between road maintenance and investment has remained relatively constant over time in 
many regions, with maintenance making up 30% of total road expenditure on average (ITF, 2011). 
The volume of maintenance for road infrastructure in Western European countries has increased 
slightly more rapidly than the volume of investment: the former grew by 25%, while the latter by 
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around 21% from 1995 to 2008. This resulted in an increased share of maintenance in total road 
expenditure, from 26% in 1997 to 30% in 2009. 
Similar to growth in the volume of investment, the volume of maintenance has grown strongly in 
Central and East European countries. The share of maintenance in total road expenditure declined 
slightly, from 30% in 1997 to 27% in 2009. The increase in maintenance volumes in 2006 and 2007 
was partly due to a major increase in road maintenance in Hungary during those years. 
In North America, the volume of maintenance has been relatively constant over time. The share of 
maintenance declined from 33% in 1997 to 31% in 2009, according to preliminary estimates. As with 
investment data, data on maintenance are also prone to limitations and uncertainties (such as the 
allocation of spending between maintenance and renewals). 
3.7 Conclusions 
We have assessed the costs and affordability of providing the transport infrastructure necessary for the 
11 SEMCs to achieve their benchmark quantities, and maintaining that infrastructure in a condition 
that is most likely to optimise the combination of infrastructure maintenance and vehicles (including 
road and rail vehicles) and in the case of airports and container berths, to avoid severe congestion. 
The costs of providing this infrastructure expressed as a percentage of GDP have been found to be 
comparable with other developing countries that have reported investing or are expected to invest. The 
shares of GDP foreseen for transport investment in the SEMCs are higher than in the EU-27 countries 
over the last decade and comparable with those projected for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries for the 
next two decades to achieve broadly similar infrastructure quantities and qualities. 
4. GDP and trade growth impacts of transport investment 
In section 4 of the report we deal with the impact of investment in transport infrastructure on GDP and 
international trade. These two impacts are linked through the standard definition of GDP, being the 
total market value of all final goods and services produced in a country in a given year, equal to total 
consumer, investment and government spending, plus the value of exports, minus the value of imports.  
GDP = Consumption goods and services (C) + Gross Investments (I) + 
 Government Purchases (G) + (Exports (X) – Imports (M)) (1) 
Transport investment contributes directly to GDP through I (gross investments) and possibly through 
G (government purchases) and less directly through C by facilitating the consumption of goods and 
services. Although a significant part of those goods and services are related to transport, most of them 
are for other sectors of the economy. Transport activities typically account for between 6% and 10% 
of GDP, although this does not include transport activities undertaken on their own behalf by 
enterprises in other economic sectors. Few reliable estimates are available of these own-account 
transport activities, and to a large degree their size depends on the efficiency of enterprises in the 
transport sector itself – the less efficient they are the greater the incentive for enterprises in other 
sectors to undertake transport activities themselves.  
In addition to these impacts of investment in transport infrastructure on the value of final goods 
produced within a country, there is a secondary impact through any net increase in international trade 
(X – M). We deal first with the impact on the value of domestic goods and services and on public and 
private investment (I + G), and then separately on changes in imports and exports (X – M), and only 
bring them together at the end of the analysis. This separation follows conventional analyses, where 
the two sets of impacts are treated independently of each other – the impacts on the value of output 
being measured quite differently from the impact on exports and imports. 
In respect of the impact on trade, if this increase is skewed in favour of imports over exports, the 
impact on GDP will be negative. So if the objective of the transport investment is to bring about 
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higher GDP (or higher GDP growth), then it is important to distinguish between impacts on exports 
and imports. 
Section 4 of this report has three subsections. In the first we summarise previous studies of the impact 
of investment in transport infrastructure on economic growth; in the second we summarise previous 
studies of the impact of transport infrastructure investment on international trade; the third part 
comprises an application of the overall conclusions from these previous studies to the investments 
implied in each of the four scenarios.  
Provision and maintenance of transport infrastructure does not of itself contribute anything to 
economic and social development other than through its direct employment and the multiplier effects 
of that employment. What the provision and maintenance of more and better infrastructure can do is to 
facilitate the provision of transport and logistics services that will have more direct economic and 
social impacts. But even better transport and logistics services are only intermediate products that 
contribute to the achievement of economic and social objectives. So trying to assess the impact of 
investment in transport infrastructure on economic and social outcomes requires a long and complex 
analysis. 
The difficulties in establishing the links between transport investment and economic and social 
outcomes are part of the explanation as to why until the last decade there had been few attempts to 
measure these impacts, and still fewer even partially successful attempts. 
4.1 Investment in transport infrastructure and economic growth 
Most of the attempts to assess the impact of transport infrastructure on economic wealth (or of changes 
in transport infrastructure on changes in economic wealth) make use of a version of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Application of the function consists of estimating the parameters of an 
infrastructure-augmented production function.  
If we consider countries i = 1…n at a time t = 1… t, the model is of this form: 
௜ܻ௧ = ܣ௜ܭ௜௧ఈܪ௜௧ఉܺ௜௧		ఊ ௜ܸ௧, 
(2) 
where Yit is the aggregate added value, Kit is a measure of physical capital, and Hit of human capital, Xit 
is infrastructure capital and Vit is an error term.  
Since it is the infrastructure services that impact on value added and this is difficult to measure 
directly, the application of the model assumes that the quantity of infrastructure services is 
proportional to the quantity of infrastructure capital. The basic model also assumes constant returns to 
scale, so that the sum of exponents is one. Dividing through by Lit and taking logs, the following 
expression results: 
ݕ
݅ݐ	=	ܽ݅+ߙ݇݅ݐ+ߚℎ݅ݐ+ߛݔ݅ݐ+ݒ݅ݐ (3) 
where yit = log (Yit) and capital stocks and outputs are in log per worker terms.  
The fixed effects ai capture all the timeless components of the total factor productivity. It is also 
possible to include in this linear specification some time effects to capture the common factors in the 
total factor productivity. This is the form of the model most used in assessments of the relationship 
between transport infrastructure and economic output.  
It is difficult to interpret directly the parameters of the equation, since infrastructure capital appears 
twice, once on its own but also as a part of aggregate capital Kit. Consequently, the parameter  cannot 
be interpreted as the infrastructure elasticity. So the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure is 
not constant and depends on the ratio of capital stocks. Yet infrastructure stocks typically account for 
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relatively small portions of overall capital stock, so the difference between the genuine elasticity 
evaluated around the sample mean and the naïve estimate should be small. 
There are two related but different approaches to estimating the impact of infrastructure on economic 
growth – the first uses a constant elasticity model while the second allows for variation in elasticity, 
usually through a threshold approach. 
Constant elasticity models 
Canning and Bennathan approach 
While several previous studies had considered the impact of transport investment on the economic 
growth of a single country (for example Aschauer, 1989), one of the first analyses using the constant 
elasticity approach and covering a large number of countries looked at the social rate of return on 
transport investment by estimating the effect on aggregate output (Canning and Bennathan, 2004).  
The approach to finding the benefits of infrastructure was to estimate an aggregate production function 
for a panel of 97 countries over a period of 40 years (1960 to 2000), including as explanatory variables 
physical capital and human capital as well as one transport infrastructure variable – paved roads, but 
also for electricity generating capacity. The marginal product of infrastructure was measured by its 
contribution to aggregate output. In contrast to an earlier analysis of the same data (Canning, 1999) 
this analysis used a translog transformation of the standard Cobb-Douglas production function to 
avoid the imposition of a declining marginal productivity of capital as the capital output ratio rises. 
This declining marginal product was believed by the authors to almost guarantee a high rate of return 
on physical and human capital in low-income countries, which they considered to be in conflict with 
observed rates of return to private capital investment. 
The authors concluded that there were diminishing rates of return on paved roads, and that this implied 
“little support for a policy of purely infrastructure led growth”. But they also concluded that 
“infrastructure (paved roads and electricity generation) is found to be strongly complementary with 
both physical and human capital, giving it an important role in a process of balanced growth and the 
possibility of acute infrastructure shortages if investment in other types of capital takes off but 
infrastructure investment lags behind”.  
Considering only the results for paved roads, the authors found that the rates of return were similar to 
or even lower than those for other forms of capital. For a few middle-income countries with an acute 
shortage of paved roads, there were very high returns on investment in this infrastructure. The authors 
also observed that these high rates of return followed a period of sustained economic growth during 
which road-building stocks had lagged behind investments in other types of capital, and that this effect 
was accentuated by the low costs of road construction in middle-income countries relative to both 
poorer and richer countries.  
An examination of the study results for paved roads in developing countries produced results that 
conflicted with the authors’ conclusion about the lower rate of return on paved roads compared with 
other investments. The authors only provide paved road results for 41 countries and of these only 26 
are developing countries. For these 26 countries, the average rate of return on investment in paved 
roads is 27.6% while that on other capital is only 5.0%. 
Calderon and Serven approach 
One of the most authoritative and comprehensive analyses of the effects of transport infrastructure on 
economic growth is provided in Calderon and Serven (2004). Their panel analyses used data from 121 
countries over a 40-year period (1960 to 2000) for four different types of infrastructure (telephone 
lines, electricity generating capacity, roads and railways, and access to safe water) and found that the 
volume of infrastructure stocks has a significant positive effect on long-run economic growth. This 
conclusion is robust to changes in the infrastructure measure used as well as the estimation technique 
applied. They also found a positive but less robust relationship between infrastructure quality and 
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growth, although they observed that this might reflect limitations of the quality measures available or 
also the fact that quantity and quality are strongly correlated, so that quality effects on growth are 
already captured by the quantity measures. The authors also investigated the impact of infrastructure 
(including transport) on income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and found a statistically 
significant negative correlation, that is increasing the quantity and quality of transport infrastructure 
would reduce income inequality. Both conclusions were applicable to all types of infrastructure, 
including roads and railways.  
The authors concluded that these results were obtained in a framework that controlled for reverse 
causation (one of the greatest sources of doubt in assessments of the relationship between 
infrastructure and growth), and that they survived a variety of statistical tests that failed to show any 
evidence of misspecification. From this they concluded that the results reflect causal, and not merely 
coincidental, effects of infrastructure on growth and inequality. 
The measures of the quantities of road and railways used in the analyses were not absolute measures, 
but were similar to one of the benchmark measures in our analysis of transport infrastructure demand 
described in section 2 of this report. For transport infrastructure, the measures were length in kms per 
unit of total land area. In section 2, we observed that using different indicators of transport 
infrastructure density (by area, per capita or per unit of GDP) produce very different results, as the 
three measures are very weakly correlated and in some cases negatively correlated. We also observed 
that for many countries, especially those that have large areas of desert or otherwise unproductive 
areas, using total land area (as used by Calderon and Serven, 2004) is a less appropriate parameter to 
assess transport density than agricultural or arable land area. So if Calderon and Serven (2004) had 
used a different measure of transport intensity (using population, GDP or agricultural or arable land 
area to derive the parameter) they would have produced different regression parameters. 
For the quality measure of transport infrastructure, the authors used the percentage of all roads that are 
paved. The measure of unpaved roads in the database used by Calderon and Serven (2004) is 
inconsistent among countries. The specification of an unpaved road is imprecise, with some countries 
including even minor paths and tracks while others only include those for which one of the three 
principal levels of administration (national, regional and local) has a specific responsibility. So if the 
quantity of unpaved roads is unreliable, then so is the percentage of unpaved roads as a measure of 
road quality. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, their analysis did provide a robust conclusion of a positive 
relationship between economic growth and quantity of transport infrastructure. The focus of their 
attention was on infrastructure in Latin America, so their examples do not include any SEMCs. The 
examples provided by the authors were for countries of Latin America to increase their transport 
infrastructure density to that of the regional leader (Costa Rica) or to that of the median country in 
East Asia (Korea). Using Argentina as the base (with a quoted transport density of road and railways 
together of 0.6 km per km2), if it were to reach the density of Korea (with 3 km per km2) then 
economic growth would be 1.4 percentage points higher.  
Although the authors do not indicate the financial cost of such an increase, we estimate that in current 
prices it would require an additional 924,000 km of road (from 231,000 km to 1,150,500 km) at a cost 
of about $0.5m per 1 km, giving an investment cost of about $462 billion. With a 2010 estimated GDP 
of $596 billion and a growth rate of 7%, the 1.4% additional growth rate would require ten years to 
generate the $462 billion equivalent to the investment cost. But the investment of $462 billion over ten 
years would be equivalent to 5.2% of GDP, a level achieved by few countries over any recent decade. 
A similar approach has been used in our assessment of the four scenarios. For each scenario, instead of 
following Calderon and Serven (2004) and using the highest density within the region as a benchmark, 
we have used the global average density (Reference scenario), the average density of the EU-27 
countries (Common Development scenario) and the average density of the per-capita income group 
(Polarised Development scenario). For the Failed Development scenario we have used the level of 
investment rather than a benchmarking criterion. 
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Threshold models 
Hurlin model 
Subsequent to the work of Calderon and Serven (2004), Hurlin (2006) returned to an earlier 
consideration, that the elasticities of GDP with respect to quantities of infrastructure investment are 
not constant. These considerations are based on what are termed network effects, that the creation of 
an infrastructure network is what generates the basis for economic growth. 
Hurlin’s main conclusion is that there is strong evidence of these network effects, revealed through the 
presence of thresholds in the relationships between output (measured by an increase in GDP) and 
private and public inputs (measured as changes in the capital stocks of infrastructure). Hurlin (2006) 
found that when the available stock of infrastructure is very low (that is, prior to the creation of a 
network), investment in infrastructure has the same productivity as investment in non-infrastructure. 
Conversely, when a minimum network is available, the marginal productivity of infrastructure 
investment is greater than the productivity of other investments. Finally, once the networks are 
established, the marginal productivity of further investment in the same type of infrastructure returns 
to become similar to that of non-infrastructure investments. 
This conclusion is important for our analysis, as it can indicate that the lower levels of investment in 
transport infrastructure implied by the Failed Development and Reference scenarios (which are above 
the first threshold and therefore at the ‘network development’ stage) might have a higher economic 
justification than the additional investment indicated in the Polarised and Common Development 
scenarios (as in these scenarios, the investment for some countries would push the network densities 
above the second threshold and so into the third development stage).  
Hurlin (2006) used a slightly different formulation of the Cobb-Douglass production function to that 
of Calderon and Serven (2004), and this required the use of transport infrastructure per worker instead 
of per km2. Also unlike Calderon and Serven, Hurlin measured road and rail infrastructure separately 
rather than together. The author assessed models with zero, three and four different thresholds of 
investment in infrastructure capital, and here we report only those for the three-threshold and four-
stage model.  
The first stage is that before the development of comprehensive transport networks. After the first 
threshold there is the second stage, where a basic network is already in place, and the effort of further 
investment is to enhance and complete that network. Beyond the second threshold where the network 
is complete is the third stage. At this stage, further investment is needed to avoid capacity constraints 
as demand increases and to accommodate new demands that emerge in locations different from those 
envisaged when the network was planned and created. At the final and fourth stage that comes after 
the third threshold, there is a need for additional new investment, but the elasticities are only slightly 
higher than in the third stage. 
Choice of threshold effects model 
We have chosen to use a two-threshold and three-stage threshold effects model. Some of the SEMCs 
have underdeveloped road and/or rail networks (and so are at the first stage, below the first threshold), 
more are in the process of completing their already basic networks (and so are at the second stage of 
development, above the first threshold), while only two (Libya and Palestine) have reached the third 
stage, above the second threshold. None of the SEMCs have yet reached the fourth stage, with 
densities above the third threshold. Application of a constant elasticity model in these circumstances 
would have the risk of giving misleading results. Table 15 shows Hurlin’s (2006) thresholds (the 
boundaries between the stages measured in km per employee) and the elasticities (in GDP per worker 
per additional unit of infrastructure). 
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Table 15. Four-stage model: Infrastructure thresholds (in km per worker) and elasticities (in GDP per 
worker in US dollars) 
Network development Paved roads Railways 
First threshold 0.360 0.240 
Second threshold 0.520 0.423 
Third threshold 3.480 2.651 
First stage 1.140 1.165 
Second stage 0.509 0.497 
Third stage 1.168 0.854 
Fourth stage 1.130 0.986 
Source: Hurlin (2006), Annex Table 4. 
The most appropriate of Hurlin’s threshold effects models for our purposes is one that used physical 
capital per worker, human capital per worker and four measures of infrastructure (paved roads, 
electricity production, telephones and railways) per worker. Here we report only the results for paved 
roads and railways per worker. 
For paved roads, there is a substantial impact on economic growth from investment even before the 
network is developed ($1.14 per worker), and although this reduces to about half once the minimum 
network threshold is reached, it increases to about 2% more than the pre-network level at the third 
stage and remains close to the pre-network level at the final stage. For railways, the economic growth 
impacts are 2% greater than for paved roads at the first stage, but fall rather more quickly at the second 
stage to about 97% of the road investment productivity. There is a recovery at the third stage but not as 
much as for road investments. A further 15% increase at the final stage still only brings the output 
elasticity or rail investment to about 87% of road investment. 
The use of network density per employee does not coincide with any of our three benchmark 
parameters – area, population and GDP. But by adapting the population benchmarks and using some 
of the results of Coutinho (2012), we can use Hurlin’s elasticities. Coutinho uses a version of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function that is very similar to that used by Hurlin (2006), and both make 
use of the same perpetual inventory method of measuring capital stocks. 
So there is a reasonable consistency between the two approaches that allows us to adapt results from 
one to the outputs of the other. Using a benchmark value of km per employee for the SEMCs, most of 
them are found to be currently at the first or second stage of development. Only Libya and Palestine 
(for paved roads) reach the third stage of network development (Table 16). 
Table 16. Paved road and railway densities (km per worker) 
 Paved roads Network Stage Railways Network Stage 
Algeria 0.425 2 0.212 1 
Egypt 0.143 1 0.144 1 
Israel 0.472 2 0.000 – 
Jordan 0.333 1 0.114 1 
Lebanon 0.321 1 0.000 – 
Libya 1.543 3 0.000 – 
Morocco 0.224 1 0.137 1 
Syria 0.199 1 0.231 1 
Tunisia 0.293 1 0.524 2 
Turkey 0.475 2 0.280 2 
Palestine 0.668 3 0.000 – 
Source: Author’s analyses based on Hurlin (2006). 
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Social, economic and political context for investment in the SEMCs 
While recognising the difficulties of assessing the direction of causality, we follow the practice of 
Canning and Bennathan (2000), Calderon and Serven (2004) and Hurlin (2006) in estimating the 
economic growth impacts of transport investment assuming that there is forward causality, that is that 
transport investment is likely to provide a context in which economic growth can take place, rather 
than that transport investment is needed because of past economic growth.  
There are several examples of recent investment support for the transport sector in some SEMCs that 
could be used as support for the forward causality perspective from the international financial 
institutions. The African Development Bank has recently (2011) provided €300 million for the 
expansion and electrification of Moroccan railways and the World Bank is negotiating with the 
government of Jordan to support the creation of a basic $3 billion railway network that will link Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Iraq. In recent years, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has supported the 
funding of many other transport infrastructure and trade facilitation projects in the SEMCs, including 
port upgrading in Syria and Lebanon. The Islamic Development Bank has helped in the funding of 
cross-border trade and transport facilities between Syria and Turkey. The EIB has been assisting the 
government of Egypt in preparing the development of inland container terminals in Cairo, important 
missing links in the country’s international trade infrastructure. The World Bank has supported 
expansion of airport facilities in Egypt. In addition to these public sector investments, private 
investment in transport infrastructure has expanded rapidly in the SEMCs and promises to continue to 
do so, so long as the social and political conditions continue to be favourable. 
4.2 Infrastructure investment and international trade 
Transport infrastructure only has an indirect impact on the volumes of international trade, as it is the 
transport and logistics services that use the infrastructure that have the direct impact. Still, many 
efforts have been made to relate quantities (and sometimes qualities) of transport infrastructure to 
volumes of international trade. Most assessments of the impact of transport infrastructure and logistics 
on international trade make use of a trade gravity model. 
The earliest models did not have access to global databases of transport infrastructure or services, and 
so relied on other measures as proxies for these trade parameters. One of the most usual and most 
limiting simplifications has been to use great circle distance as a proxy for transport costs. This is 
doubly unfortunate as it is only a very imprecise substitute for cost, and since it is a fixed measure, it is 
not susceptible to policy changes. Any policies aimed at reducing transport costs would have no 
impact on the results of such a model as the great circle distances do not change as costs change. 
To overcome this deficiency, most trade gravity models now include a number of other measures that 
compensate for the deficiency of distance as a proxy for cost. One of the most usual is to include the 
number of international borders that trade between land-locked and other countries must cross. 
Although this has allowed estimates of the distance equivalence of a border to be made, since it is 
rarely possible to eliminate a border completely, this device is not useful as a policy variable. It is 
preferable to use the time taken to cross the border as the gravity model variable, so any reduction in 
the time taken can be estimated using the gravity model elasticity derived for this parameter.  
Other models have used proxies for port costs and logistics. Wilson et al. (2003) developed a gravity 
model of trade in manufactured products of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) 
countries that included composite indices for port efficiency and customs performance (this model was 
developed before the Logistics Performance Index was available) based on surveys of users’ 
perceptions of how well these functions were performed in each country. The model also included 
parameters that measured trade tariffs and membership of regional international trade agreements 
(such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum). Apart from these additional 
parameters, their model followed the standard formulation of an international gravity model. 
The authors used a similar approach to our benchmarking method, estimating the increases in 
international trade if countries performing below average improved their port efficiency and customs 
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performance to half the score of the average performers. This benchmarking was applied to the 
individual countries and to the region as a whole, as improvements in one country’s export 
performance would impact on the imports of all its trading partners, and similarly an improvement in 
customs performance would impact on the exports of all trading partners. Even these limited 
improvements were predicted by the model to bring about a 21% increase in trade in manufactured 
products. About 46% of this increase would come from improvements in port efficiency and the 
remainder from improvements to customs. 
Only the model developed specifically for the MEDPRO analysis of shallow and deep integration 
(Ghoneim et al., 2011) comes close to what is needed in our analysis. This model was initially 
designed to estimate the trade impacts of reducing or eliminating trade tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
The form of the model used was the following: 
 jijkjkjjk TRANSCOSTNTMsTARSUMGDPX lnlnlnln 43210    
  ijtkjjj COLLANG   lnln 65  (4) 
where Xjk is the exports of country j of category k (HS 2 level code), SUMGDP is the sum of the GDPs 
of country j and its trade partner Mediterranean countries, TARjk is the average tariff level of country j 
on products of HS code k, NTMijk is a dummy parameter that takes the value 1 if there are non-tariff 
measures between country i and j on products of HS code k and the value zero otherwise, 
TRANSCOSTj is the average transport cost of products to country j, LANGj is another dummy variable 
that has a value 1 if countries i and j have a common language and zero otherwise, COLj is another 
dummy variable with the value 1 if there was a colonial relationship between countries i and j and zero 
otherwise, and the remaining terms are country fixed effects and error terms. 
It included an actual measure of trade costs rather than use distance as a proxy. Yet, since 
transportation costs were not the principal focus of the analysis, the trade cost measure chosen (the 
cost of a container movement between Mediterranean and other EU ports) was not all inclusive as it 
did not specifically include port costs (other than those reflected in the container tariff) or inland 
transport costs. It is the port and inland transport costs that are most likely to be influenced by 
transport infrastructure investments. In the final version of the model, however, a measure of distance 
was used – a distance-weighted distribution of the population within each country.  
An alternative measure of transport costs can be provided by the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 
developed by the World Bank. This is not a measure of distance or cost but a weighted average index 
of seven measures of logistics performance, including efficiency of the clearance process by customs 
and other border agencies, the quality of transport and information technology infrastructure for 
logistics, the ease of arranging international shipments, the competence of the local logistics industry, 
the ability to trace and check international shipments, and domestic logistics costs as well as the 
timeliness of shipments in reaching their destination. 
To estimate the trade creation effects of shallow and deep integration, Ghoneim et al. (2011) observed 
that it is important that all the relevant policy measures be considered as a package and not 
independently, as the effects are not additive. 
4.3 Economic growth and international trade impacts of the four 
scenarios 
We have used the elasticities and thresholds derived from Hurlin (2006), together with the additions to 
transport infrastructure indicated in section 3 of this report, to derive estimates of the direct impact of 
those investments on the GDP of each of the SEMCs for each of the four scenarios. Furthermore, we 
have used the elasticities derived from Ghoneim et al. (2011), together with the same additions to the 
transport infrastructure stock, to produce estimates of the impact of those changes on the imports and 
exports of each of the SEMCs. Finally, we have added the net trade impact to the direct GDP impact 
to derive estimates of the overall impact of the transport investments on GDP. None of the elasticity 
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estimates available apply to ports or airports. So we have approximated the direct GDP impact of 
investments in these sectors by using the average elasticities of those for roads and railways. 
i) Estimates of the economic growth impacts of infrastructure investment 
The estimates of the growth impacts of infrastructure investment are based on the infrastructure per 
employee elasticities and threshold values indicated by Hurlin (2006). 
One additional and important assumption needed to be made. The increases in quantities of transport 
infrastructure are smaller than the increases in population and employment that will take place over 
the same period. So if we use the future employment rates to calculate the benchmark values, they will 
all show reductions from the base year (2008) and the model will show an apparent decline in GDP 
despite the major investments that are suggested. We have therefore used the employment numbers of 
the base year to calculate the future year (2030) benchmark values. 
In addition, Hurlin (2006) only estimated elasticity values for paved roads and railways, so we have 
been unable to make any estimates of the GDP growth impact of investment in unpaved roads, ports or 
airports (runways and terminals). While an omission, we do not think it serious and the major impacts 
on GDP growth are expected to come from paved roads and railways. 
To derive indications of the impact of the investments on the level of GDP, we have applied the GDP 
growth elasticities to the difference between the current and projected benchmark values 
(quantity/number of employees) for paved roads and railways for each scenario (Table 17). The GDP 
data do not distinguish among their various components (consumption, government purchases, gross 
investment and net trade flows), so the GDP growth factors estimated here are inclusive of those 
estimated for the trade impacts in the following subsection.  
The growth rates are the average annual impact on GDP over the 20-year planning period. 
Table 17. Road and rail investment impacts on annual GDP growth 
Country Reference  
scenario 
Common Development 
scenario 
Polarised Development 
scenario 
Failed Development 
scenario 
 Increase in GDP annual growth rate (%) 
Algeria 0.8 1.9 1.4 0.5 
Egypt 0.7 1.3 0.6 0.3 
Israel 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Jordan 1.2 2.1 1.4 0.6 
Lebanon 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Libya 0.7 2.2 3.8 0.9 
Morocco 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.3 
Syria 1.7 1.6 0.6 0.2 
Tunisia 1.5 2.4 0.3 0.2 
Turkey 0.4 2.0 1.0 0.4 
Palestine 0.8 1.9 1.4 0.5 
11 SEMCs 0.7 1.7 0.9 0.3 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Not surprisingly, the largest impact of transport investment comes from the Common Development 
scenario, with an average impact on GDP growth of 1.7% per year (weighted by base year GDP per 
country), with the least impact coming from the Failed Development scenario (with an impact on GDP 
of only 0.3% per year). The largest impacts by country are for Libya (all three Development 
scenarios); Tunisia, Jordan and Turkey for the Common Development scenario; Algeria, Jordan and 
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Palestine for the Polarised scenario; and Jordan, Algeria and Palestine for the Failed Development 
scenario. Only in the Common Development scenario is there any impact on Lebanon’s GDP. 
The cumulative sum of increases in GDP over the 20-year analysis period is much greater than the 
investment cost. The largest ratio of GDP increase to investment costs are for the Common 
Development scenario, with an average over all 11 SEMCs of more then 8.5, while the smallest ratio 
is for the Failed Development scenario at less than 3.5. For the Reference and Polarised scenarios the 
ratio is about 6.0. 
ii) Estimates of the trade impacts of infrastructure investments 
We have used the version of the Ghoneim et al. (2011) model that uses values of the Logistics 
Performance Index as one of the independent variables. In Table 12 of Ghoneim et al. (2011), the 
elasticities of imports and exports for the SEMCs are 1.55 and 2.39 respectively. 
The LPI values we have used are those in the 2010 version, and are taken from the LPI website. As 
observed by Ghoneim et al. (2011), unlike the 2008 version, Morocco and Palestine are the only 
SEMCs not included. We have estimated the 2010 Morocco LPI value by attributing to Morocco the 
average increase of the 11 SEMCs from 2008 to 2010. Since Palestine was not included in the 2007 
LPI and its characteristics are so different from the other SEMCs, we have not been able to include it 
in our trade analyses. So with the addition of Morocco, we have the detailed LPI results for each of the 
six components and the overall average LPI for ten of the SEMCs. 
Table 18. LPI 2010 and its component values 
Country 
LPI Customs Infrastructure International 
shipments 
Logistics 
competence 
Tracking 
and 
tracing 
Timeliness 
Algeria 2.3 1.9 2.06 2.7 2.24 2.26 2.81 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.6 2.1 2.22 2.56 2.87 2.56 3.31 
Israel 3.4 3.1 3.60 3.17 3.50 3.39 3.77 
Jordan 2.7 2.3 2.69 3.11 2.49 2.33 3.39 
Lebanon 3.3 3.2 3.05 2.87 3.73 3.16 3.97 
Libya 2.3 2.1 2.18 2.28 2.28 2.08 2.98 
Morocco 2.5 2.3 2.51 2.89 2.24 2.10 3.00 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 2.7 2.3 2.45 2.87 2.59 2.63 3.45 
Tunisia 2.8 2.4 2.56 3.36 2.36 2.56 3.57 
Turkey 3.2 2.8 3.08 3.15 3.23 3.09 3.94 
Middle East & 
North Africa 2.6 2.3 2.36 2.65 2.53 2.46 3.22 
Lower middle 
income 2.5 2.2 2.27 2.66 2.48 2.58 3.24 
Upper middle 
income 2.8 2.4 2.54 2.86 2.71 2.89 3.36 
MED-9 2.8 2.5 2.68 2.96 2.84 2.73 3.52 
World 2.8 2.5 2.64 2.85 2.76 2.92 3.41 
Mashreq 2.6 2.3 2.38 2.60 2.78 2.52 3.27 
Maghreb 2.93 2.52 2.78 3.21 2.69 2.66 3.63 
Source: LPI, World Bank (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTTRANSPORT/EXTTLF/ 
0,,contentMDK:21514122~menuPK:3875957~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:515434,00.html). 
32 | ROBIN CARRUTHERS 
 
We have estimated the impact on LPI of investment in infrastructure by considering only the transport 
infrastructure component of the LPI for each of the ten countries. For each country we have assessed 
the increase in the LPI score for infrastructure based on the percentage increase in the quantity of 
infrastructure for each scenario. A country that would have an average increase of 15% in its 
quantities of six types of transport infrastructure (paved roads, unpaved roads, railways, runways, 
passenger terminals and container berths) would be assessed as having an increase of 15% in its LPI 
score for infrastructure. These country LPI increases result in the following average increases in the 
infrastructure component of the LPI for each scenario: 
 Reference scenario +16% 
 Common Development scenario +28% 
 Polarised Development scenario +22% 
 Failed Development scenario +13%. 
The resulting percentage changes in the total LPI for each scenario are shown in Table 19. The 
differences in the percentage changes in the total LPI among countries are small, as the transport 
infrastructure component is only one of six that make up the LPI, and the 2010 LPI transport scores 
for each country cover a relatively small range of values (a minimum of 2.06 for Algeria and a 
maximum of 3.60 for Israel.  
Table 19. Changes in LPI attributable to transport infrastructure investment (%) 
Country 
Percentage + Increase in total LPI 
Reference 
scenario 
Common 
Development 
scenario 
Polarised 
Development 
scenario 
Failed 
Development 
scenario 
Algeria 11 42 18 8 
Egypt 27 42 40 19 
Israel 5 13 6 4 
Jordan 15 25 18 9 
Lebanon 9 16 15 9 
Libya 8 21 20 8 
Morocco 12 35 13 6 
Syrian 9 21 13 7 
Tunisia 13 36 12 7 
Turkey 10 21 14 8 
11 SEMC 
average 11 25 15 8 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
By applying the elasticities of Ghoneim et al. (2011), we derive the percentage changes in imports and 
non-oil and gas exports for each country. Since the differences in percentage changes in LPI are small, 
so are the differences in their impacts on imports and exports. The average impact on the trade 
balances are shown in Table 20. The impact of transport investment on the trade balance is relatively 
small in the Failed Development and Reference scenarios, while the impacts in the Common and 
Polarised Development scenarios are substantial. 
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Table 20. Increase in trade balance (exports–imports) (as % of GDP) 
Country 
2008 Non-oil 
trade 
balance 
Reference 
scenario 
Common 
Development 
scenario 
Polarised 
Development 
scenario 
Failed 
Development 
scenario 
Average 
over all 
scenarios 
Algeria -3.8 6.7 26.5 11.2 5.2 12.4 
Egypt -2.4 16.8 26.5 25.4 12.1 20.2 
Israel 1.6 3.0 8.1 3.6 2.3 4.2 
Jordan -22.5 9.3 15.7 11.2 5.4 10.4 
Lebanon -20.7 5.6 10.0 9.3 5.5 7.6 
Libya -7.3 4.8 13.1 12.6 5.3 8.9 
Morocco -8.2 7.7 22.2 8.1 4.1 10.5 
Syria 0.0 5.7 13.5 8.4 4.5 8.0 
Tunisia -1.9 8.2 22.9 7.7 4.6 10.9 
Turkey -0.6 6.4 13.2 8.6 4.9 8.3 
Average -2.6 7.4 17.2 10.6 5.4 10.1 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Egypt stands to gain the most across all scenarios, with a mean of almost double the average of the 11 
SEMCs (20.2% against 12.4%). Algeria has the next highest average improvement in its trade balance, 
mostly attributable to its performance under the Common Development scenario, from which it gains 
as much as Egypt. Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan are the other countries that have higher than average 
improvements in their average trade balance. 
Table 20 shows the expected change in the non-oil trade surplus consequent upon implementing the 
investments indicated for each scenario, and the first column shows the actual non-oil trade balances 
for each country. If there were to be no other changes to the trade balance, implementing the transport 
infrastructure investments would change the balance from a negative 2.6% of GDP in 2006 to an 
average positive of 7.5% (that is, 10.1%-2.6%). So Jordan and Lebanon would continue with a 
negative non-oil balance, but Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey would change from 
a negative to a positive balance. 
Morocco stands to gain most in terms of exports, with a slightly greater excess (nearly four percentage 
points) over the 11 SEMCs and the scenario average than for imports. Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia are 
next in gains in exports, while Libya and Lebanon have the least to gain. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Investment in transport infrastructure will increase the annual average rate of economic growth of the 
SEMCs by between 0.3% per year and 1.7% per year, depending on the scenario. The transport 
investment will also increase the total volume of trade and the positive trade balance, the latter by 
between 5.4% and 17.2%, again depending on the scenario. While the increase in GDP is an annual 
impact and so is cumulative over the 20-year analysis period, the increase in trade and the trade 
balance is an average over the whole period. The ratio of total GDP increase to transport investment 
costs varies between 3.5 for the Failed Development scenario and 8.5 for the Common Development 
scenario. This not only indicates that the investment in transport is worthwhile in all the scenarios, but 
also that the marginal increases in investment have positive returns, that is, the higher investment in 
the Common Development scenario brings greater per-unit benefits than the lower (but still 
worthwhile) investment in the other scenarios. 
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EuroMed Transport Project (studies) 
http://www.euromedtransport.org/En/home_4_46 
World Bank, Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostics  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMM
UNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/0,,contentMDK:21525984~isCURL:Y~pagePK:210058~
piPK:210062~theSitePK:282823,00.html 
World Bank, Logistics Performance Index (2010)  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTTRANSPORT/EXTTLF/0,,conte
ntMDK:21514122~menuPK:3875957~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:515434,00.html 
World Bank, Road Cost Knowledge System (ROCKS)  
http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rd_tools/rocks_main.htm 
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